Feuding Rebel Diplomats: Unheralded and Under-Appreciated

Book Reviews

Potts, Louis W. Arthur Lee, a Virtuous Revolutionary. Southern Biography Series. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981.

Van Vlack, Milton C. Silas Deane: Revolutionary War Diplomat and Politician. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2013.

Despite being little known today, Silas Deane and Arthur Lee were the two most polarizing Rebel leaders during the American Revolution.[i] Clashes between these two Paris-based diplomats would consume countless hours, bitterly dividing the Continental Congress into Dean and Lee partisans for most of the Revolutionary War and beyond. The Dean faction included commercially minded leaders such as Robert Morris and Carter Braxton. At the same time, Lee’s supporters were more politically radical revolutionaries, such as his brother, Richard Henry Lee, and Samual Adams.

The heart of the Dean-Lee dispute was the conduct of diplomacy with the French government, which metastasized into a bitter personal enmity between the two emissaries. Dean practiced a combined commercial and state diplomacy. The former Congressional delegate from Connecticut engaged in business ventures on behalf of the rebelling states, in which it was hard to separate official from personal affairs. While potentially shady, some of these transactions significantly benefited the Rebellion by providing indispensable armaments and supplies. On the other hand, Lee sought to separate commercial from diplomatic treaties with independent envoys to prevent self-dealing. Deane focused on developing commercial and military relationships with and through France, while Lee advocated directly approaching other European powers independently of France for aid and commercial ties.

The best way to understand the antagonists is to contrast the latest biographers’ descriptions of their characters, motivations, accomplishments, and legacies. Milton C. Van Vlack, a retired high school teacher and adjunct college faculty, penned the most recent Deane biography in 2013. Exhibiting a life-long interest in Deane, Van Vlack asserts that his new volume offers insights such as membership in Freemasonry and foreign intelligence operations not found in the 1975 Coy Hilton James biography.[ii] Louis W. Potts, a former professor at the University of Missouri – Kansas City, composed the only Arthur Lee biography not authored by a family member in 1981. Potts places Lee in the best possible light, noting significant interpersonal and judgment issues.[iii]

Both authors suggest critical character flaws in their subjects and criticize the other protagonist.  Potts offers a detailed assessment of Lee’s character as a misfit (page 278), self-righteous (183), prickly (190), and insisting on virtuous behaviors from others but not always himself. The former University of Missouri professor believes many of these traits emanate from absent parents and an unloved childhood. To provide balance, Potts quotes a neutral John Adams view of Lee, “His manners were polite, his reading extensive, his attention to business was punctual, and his integrity beyond reproach.” (201). On the other hand, Van Vlack believes Lee was a miserable, rotten personality (5) who had an exaggerated view of himself (76) and inappropriately acted audacious as a diplomat, which the French resented (87). The Deane biographer concludes that Lee’s hatred of Deane went well beyond ordinary professional conflicts as the Virginian made it his life’s mission to destroy his fellow emissary (192).

As to Deane’s character, his biographer described the Connecticut merchant as a “kind and pleasant man” who “spoke with clarity, force, and frankness that bordered on bluntness” (22). As a diplomat, Van Vlack asserts that Deane acted with masonic dignity and exquisite manners (8), aspiring to rise socially in all his endeavors (20). Lee’s biographer paints a different picture of Deane’s character. Potts characterizes Deane as haughty and abusive towards Lee (189). Additionally, he questions Lee’s integrity by averring that the Connecticut diplomat made 20,000 livres on war speculation insurance in London and suspected Deane “fell victim” to British bribes (188).

Despite deep character flaws, both biographers believe their subjects were motivated by patriotism. However, Van Vlack responds to severe charges that after returning to Europe as a private citizen in 1781, Deane became a turncoat. At least eleven letters to friends in Connecticut were intercepted and published by a Loyalist newspaper in New York City. Deane attempted to counter their apparent traitorous intent to Benjamin Franklin, who rejected the explanations and severed his relationship with Deane. Van Vlack offers that there is a potential that the newspaper inappropriately edited the letters to make Deane look bad.  Deane’s biographer “refutes” the letters’ “falsehoods” without providing any specifics. After the war, Deane moved to London to re-ignite the business deals he sought before the Rebellion. During this period, Benedict Arnold visited with Deane, providing further evidence to critics that he was a traitor.

While Potts does not wade into the controversy over Deane’s loyalty, he asserts that Deane inappropriately pursued commercial gains while a diplomatic envoy (15). The Lee biographer notes that John Adams worked with Lee to review Deane’s accounts and transactions, providing impartial third-party evidence of inappropriate gains. On the other hand, Deane’s biographer asserts that the profiteering charges never held water as historians do not understand eighteenth-century commerce, which, in agrarian societies, all merchants were crooks. Congress did not pay living expenses, so depositing all funds into the commission’s accounts to keep the diplomats operating was standard practice. As a counterpoint, Potts reports that Adams predicted Deane’s return to America “in such splendor” would raise an “altercation” (201). In contrast, Van Vlack offers impartial evidence from an 1842 Congressional review of Deane’s diplomatic activities, which found that his services were “highly important and valuable services to his country” (187). Likely, the last word on Deane’s patriotism and self-dealing remains outstanding.

Van Vlack believes that Deane provided many accomplishments to the Revolutionary cause, including backing and funding Benedict Arnold’s 1775 capture of Fort Ticonderoga, being a “top member of the first and second Continental Congresses” (4), conducting a highly successful secret mission to France, and recruiting at least sixty military officers, including Lafayette, to provide much needed military expertise (101). Finally, Deane’s efforts secured many of the weapons and supplies used by the Continental Army to capture the British Army at the Battle of Saratoga. On the other hand, the Deane biographer believes that Lee was philosophical, leading to intellectual disputes with few tangible benefits to the Patriot cause (5).

Lee’s biographer recognizes that the French ministry supported Deane but did not trust Lee, limiting his effectiveness (213). However, Potts credits Lee with initiating “militia diplomacy,” a technique successfully employed to finalize the 1783 Treaty of Paris.[iv] John Adams coined the term with the statement, “Your Veterans in Diplomaticks and in Affairs of State consider Us as a kind of Militia, and hold Us perhaps, as is natural, in some degree of Contempt, but wise Men know that Militia sometimes gain Victories over regular Troops, even by departing from the Rules.”[v] Potts defines militia diplomacy as “an impetuous approach to foreign affairs that defied the ageless codes of Old World diplomacy and relied on an image of virtuous plain-dealing.” Lee believed that it was beneath the dignity of the US to resort to traditional diplomatic measures. The Americans could appear at European courts, describe commercial advantages, enter treaties of alliance and commerce, and not be subordinate to French interests. (166).

“The most visible example of what Adams himself called “militia diplomacy” was the action of Congress in sending missions to countries such as Austria or Prussia without prior knowledge of the willingness of those courts to receive American diplomats” (168). As a result, Potts offered that Benjamin Franklin and many Europeans looked at the Americans as ingenuous and weak negotiators. Quoting Franklin, “I have long been humiliated with the idea of our running about from court-to-court begging for money and friendship which hare the more withheld the more eagerly they are solicited, and would perhaps have been offered, if they had not been asked” (70-1).

Potts concludes that Lee equated militia diplomacy with virtuous diplomacy (166). While Lee obtained limited benefits from an uninvited trip to the Spanish court, other militia diplomats failed in Prussia, Tuscany, and Russia. On the other hand, John Adams successfully negotiated a critical loan from the Dutch Republic. Potts concludes that Lee did not personally benefit from his militia diplomacy concept. However, Franklin, John Jay, and John Adams successfully adopted Lee’s militia diplomatic strategy of self-reliance and independence from the Bourbon empires to conclude a separate peace with Britain.

The Deane-Lee biographers agree that their protagonists have been “erased from history” (Van Vlack, 184) and eclipsed by more successful founders, such as Benjamin Franklin and Robert Morris, who could achieve more communal goals (Potts, 284).  The Deane biographer points to Lee as the culprit for Deane’s lack of a legacy. He states, “Arthur Lee’s and his congressional allies’ successful efforts to run Silas Deane is a black mark against the Continental Congress that simply cannot be excused or erased. (Van Vlack, 5). Despite this strident statement, astute readers will remain unconvinced and still be troubled by Deane’s financial self-dealing and seemingly traitorous conduct.

Another area of agreement is both envoys had trouble settling their diplomatic service accounts. Deane never received any reimbursement for his diplomatic expenses during his lifetime. His descendants received $37,000 in 1842, or about one million dollars today. Lee eventually settled his accounts in 1785 for an undisclosed amount. After retiring from government service, Lee appeared wealthy, leaving a long list of luxury items at his death. Potts’s work would have benefited from an assessment of the source of his affluence. Lee’s biographer does state that Lee was a man who railed against others while engaging in similar conduct. Perhaps Lee financially benefitted more from his diplomatic service than was recognized in Potts’s narrative.

Both men were unfulfilled and unhappy at the end of their lives.  Despite Deane’s commercial acumen, he lived in relative poverty after the revolution in London, subsisting on the generosity of friends. The lack of financial resources makes one think Deane’s intermingling of commercial and diplomatic affairs was not as lucrative as Lee alleged. Deane passed away suddenly at the start of a voyage to the United States, attempting to clear his name and restore commercial ties. At least Lee found pleasure in being a gentleman farmer after the conflict. While Lee had few close relationships, tutoring and sharing life learnings with Thomas Lee Shippen, a nephew, engendered his highest personal engagement at the end.

After reading the two biographies, it remains difficult to discern who the injured party was in the Deane-Lee imbroglio. However, each author makes the case that the feuding duo contributed substantially to the Patriot cause despite their character limitations and self-serving motivations. Lee was a talented pre-war pamphleteer who helped Americans understand British intentions and, as an envoy during the war, advocated diplomatic approaches that ultimately concluded a favorable peace treaty. Deane’s covert activities to acquire weapons and uniforms gave the Continental Army the means to defeat the British at the pivotal Saratoga battle. Additionally, he recruited valuable French volunteers for Washington to prosecute the war successfully. For these actions alone, Arthur Lee and Silas Deane deserve recognition as essential contributors to American independence.

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[i] Some historians might assert that General Horatio Gates and George Washington’s clash over command of the Continental Army was the most divisive leadership tussle. However, the command dispute lasted for a shorter period (less than a year) and ended with minimal controversy as Washington became the clear winner after the Battle of Monmouth. Many Continental Congress delegates bitterly fought but turnover and moving on to other issues ended many debates.

[ii] A scholarly review of Albion College Professor Coy Hilton James’s biography supports Van Vlack’s view that a new Silas Deane biography is warranted, Brian N. Morton, Book Review of Silas Deane – Patriot or Traitor? by Coy Hilton James, Eighteenth-Century Studies 10, no. 3 (1977): 369–71, https://doi.org/10.2307/2737907.

[iii] For a non-biographical account of the Dean-Lee dispute see Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 243–74.

[iv] “Militia diplomacy was a system whereby straightforward, unequivocating ministers in quest of recognition and financial aid were sent uninvited to foreign courts.” Mary Briant Foley, “The Triumph of Militia Diplomacy: John Adams in the Netherlands, 1780-1782, dissertation, Loyola University Chicago, 1968 https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/938, 2.

[v] “From John Adams to Robert R. Livingston, 21 February 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-12-02-0162. [Original source: The Adams Papers, Papers of John Adams, vol. 12, October 1781 – April 1782, ed. Gregg L. Lint, Richard Alan Ryerson, Anne Decker Cecere, C. James Taylor, Jennifer Shea, Celeste Walker, and Margaret A. Hogan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004, pp. 250–259.] Additional commentary is provided in Kaplan, Lawrence S. Review of Paranoia and American Revolutionary Diplomacy, by James H. Hutson. Reviews in American History 9, no. 2 (1981): 166–71. https://doi.org/10.2307/2701981.